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Firm with Inventive Capacity ---» Manufacturing Firm ---» Consumer
In a world without transaction costs and perfect information (and a system of enforceable contracts), we would observe optimal invention even in the absence of property rights.
1 Firms needing inventions to reduce their cost of production, for example, would know which firms possessed the capacity to invent the necessary improvements. If transacting were costless, then a deal would be struck whereby the firms would enter into service contracts for the requisite invention. No property right in the invention would need to be assigned by law; the enforceable contract for invention would provide an adequate incentive to invent. This is true even in the case where social welfare demanded multiple parties be allowed to use the invention. If contracting were costless and information perfect, the inventive firm could enter into multiple agreements with all potential users and make efficient price adjustments.
2
In fact, when transaction costs are especially low in the real world, we observe inventive behavior that does not require the creation of property rights. Large manufacturing firms with active R&D departments play all three roles delineated above. They have significant inventive capacity; they are innovators; and they can be consumers of their own inventions. In this situation, transacting is close to costless. The firm knows its own needs, the available alternatives, and it can communicate cheaply with its R&D department. Society does not need patent law in order to stimulate the General Motors R&D department to invent an improvement for GM cars (at least in the case where the improvement only works in GM cars).
Ronald Coase, whose famous thought experiment 3 about liability rules inspires this essay, realized that the cost of transacting in the real world is usually much higher than in the GM hypothetical. 4 In fact, the specific costs that he identified in The Problem of Social Cost are especially relevant in the context of contracting over inventive activity. Following his analysis, transaction costs can be divided into three main groups:
Discovery Costs ("the cost to discover who it is that one wishes to deal with [and] to inform people that one wishes to deal");
5
Negotiation Costs ("[the cost to supply] terms, to conduct negotiations leading up to a bargain, [and] to draw up the contract"); 6 Monitoring Costs ("[the cost] to undertake the inspection needed to make sure that the terms of the contract are being observed and so on").
7
All of these costs are significant in the context of contracting for inventions. It is difficult to identify inventors and inventions; 8 pricing difficulties and lack of public information make licensing and sales agreements difficult to negotiate; 9 and monitoring costs are significant, especially when the invention is still secret.
10
3 See Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, in THE FIRM, THE MARKET AND THE LAW 95-156 (1988) (showing that in two-party nuisance scenarios the parties will contract for the efficient result regardless of the legal liability rule). 4 See id. at 114 (a world without transaction costs "is, of course, a very unrealistic proposition); id. at 117 (using airborne pollution as an example of a situation where the cost of transacting between the polluter and those effected would be very high) 5 Id at 114. 6 Id. Patent law also facilitates long term planning by firms by creating an affirmative asset partition that protects patent assets from the claims made by the creditors and heirs of an inventor who has transferred it to the firm.
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The alternative common law model, trade secrecy, suffers from much higher costs in all three areas. It's much more difficult to discover a trade secret than a patented invention. And as Arrow pointed out, it's much more costly to negotiate over a trade secret. 22 Moreover, trade secrets are "leaky." Once they are made public, they are free for all to use, which greatly raises monitoring costs at all levels of production and transfer. 23 The creation of a properly administered property right lowers the cost of transacting for inventions, but the patent system cannot reduce all transaction costs to zero. here is a significant obstacle--known as "Arrow's Information Paradox"--to bargaining over secret information. A trade secret owner generally is reluctant to reveal the secret unless the potential licensee first promises not to use it in the event a license is not negotiated. The licensee, on the other hand, is not likely to make such a promise without first learning the secret." rights can sometimes create transaction costs. 24 Congress is therefore sensitive to the shape of patent law in order to reduce the cost of the artificially created right. 25 For example, consider the GM hypothetical above that suggested GM needs no property right to innovate for its own cars.
If Congress creates a patent right, however, GM might worry that someone would reverse engineer or independently invent its improvement, obtain a patent on it, and charge GM a licensing fee for using its own creation. Present novelty rules prevent this inefficient scenario from occurring as long as GM is the first to invent or make a commercial use of the invention before someone else invents.
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Patent law, it appears, serves two functions. Its primary function is to create a property right that reduces the cost of contracting between inventive firms and firms needing inventions.
Its secondary function is to police inefficiencies and maximize the social value of the new property right, including monitoring the cost of administering the patent system. Current controversies over the shape of the patent system implicate both its primary and secondary functions.
First, many suggestions for reforming the patent system revolve around improving the certainty of the boundaries of the property right, patent law's notice function. The primary function of patent law is ill-served if the property right embodied in the patent has poorly defined boundaries and therefore does a poor job of reducing transaction costs. Jim Bessen and Mike
Meurer devote much of their recent book to notice problems in the patent system. 27 As they note 24 See Richard A. Posner , ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 35 (4th ed. 1992) ("the costs of effecting a transfer of right-transaction costs-are often prohibitive, and when this is so, giving someone the exclusive right to a resource may reduce rather than increase efficiency" Tort law is similarly sensitive. In theory, negligence law incentivizes the optimal number of accidents; yet, justifying optimal damage rules for negligence does not require an ex ante calculation of how many accidents should occur. 44 The due care standard plus the compensatory damages rule provide adequate incentives for behavior without the need to predict or even model the optimal amount of accidents. 45 The path taken is indirect in that the goal of efficiently deterring accidents is achieved without assuming their optimal number. The patent remedy model set forth below similarly seeks to deter infringement efficiently without directly stating the optimal amount of R&D expenditures. 
III.
Although one would observe optimal inventive activity in a world without transaction costs, the remedial model proposed below must provide proper incentives for firms under more realistic conditions. Therefore, a key variable is S, the cost of searching for the invention and 46 If the search and negotiation costs were only slightly greater than X, a voluntary transaction might still be most efficient when the costs of adjudication are taken into account.
negotiating a license. The goal of remedies for patent infringement should be to provide incentives for efficient transactions to occur, while accounting for the cost of transacting. The model assumes a two-party transaction, keeping in mind that a transaction can be voluntary or
involuntary. An efficient transaction occurs between a party with inventive capacity (hereafter "inventing firm") and a party needing an invention (hereafter "exploiting firm") when:
VI -min{S, SI} -VS > C
where:
VI = gross value of the invention to the exploiting firm in terms of additional profits earned from additional sales or manufacturing costs saved. In other words, an efficient transfer occurs when the net expected gain to the exploiting firm of using the new invention is greater than the inventing firm's cost of inventing. The exploiting firm's net gain, importantly, is not merely the gross extra profits that the exploiting firm would earn by using the new invention. The net gain must account for the fact that the exploiting firm will either incur costs to search for an invention possessed by someone else or to invent the improvement itself. It must also account for the possibility that switching to the nextbest technology might be more efficient. So, the net gain is the gross value of the invention minus the lesser of the costs of searching or self-inventing, represented as min{S, SI}, minus the value of the next best substitute.
Looking at the other side of the inequality, it's clear that assigning a value to C must be done with some precision if one is to identify whether a transfer is efficient. Note that from an ex ante perspective, the invention would not have been produced in the absence of a reward of at least C inv to the inventive firm. As Elhauge notes, unless the inventor anticipates a reward greater than its investment, it will not invent and there will be nothing to transfer. 47 Furthermore, where the inventive firm and the exploiting firm are competitors, the inventive firm may anticipate losing profits if the invention is transferred. In such a case, the full cost of inventing, C, equals the sum of C inv and C trans .
Assuming that all the private gains identified have corresponding public ones and there are no negative externalities, society should want a transfer of technology to occur whenever VI -min{S, SI} -VS > C. Efficient remedies for patent infringement, therefore, should encourage transactions meeting this condition and should deter transactions where VI -min{S, SI} -VS < C.
Since remedial models need only address situations where the inventive firm has already chosen to incur the cost of invention (without invention there can be no infringement), no variable is included to account for the possibility that the inventive firm might have more profitably expended its resources on a different project.
Finally, the remedial model below assumes that the inventive firm obtains priority to patent its invention either because it is the first-to-invent or because it is the first to apply for a patent. 48 In other words, the model assumes a property right is available to the inventive firm. . 48 The present U.S. rule rewards the first-to-invent, but a rational group of inventive and exploiting firms might agree ex ante to a property right regime that rewards the first to register the invention in the patent
As noted above, making a property right available to inventive firms reduces public costs in various important ways. 49 Although the patent right may raise costs in some individual cases, the overall savings of firmly established boundary rights are likely to dwarf those costs. In addition, at least some incentives to invent would be diminished by assuming no liability. 50 Of course, the patent law presently establishes a property rule, imposing strict liability for the unauthorized appropriation of patented inventions.
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It is the assumption of a property right that makes the remedial question salient. How should the law react to an unauthorized invasion of that property right? The typical response in tort law has been to distinguish between intentional and unintentional infringements of rights.
Borrowing from that remedial template, four primary patent infringement scenarios describe the field of potential infringement. They encompass infringements that are intentional or unintentional in contexts where a transaction is efficient and when it is not. The goal is to identify remedies for each scenario that provide incentives for firms to engage in efficient behavior. In a world without transaction costs, the parties would contract for office, as opposed to rewarding the first to actually invent. Rewarding the first to make a public disclosure and thereby reduce search costs has a significant appeal. For the purposes of this paper, the choice between first-to-invent and first-to-apply is immaterial. infringement is analytically easier to address once the questions raised by intentional wrongdoing have been answered. So we begin here.
Consider first the context of a transaction that would have been efficient for the parties to enter into ex ante, but the infringing firm chose to pirate the invention instead. When a transaction is efficient, then wealth is created equal to VI -min{S, SI} -VS -C. This represents the net value of the invention, the value that the parties would have bargained over. Let L denominate the licensing fee that the infringing firm would have paid for the privilege of using the invention had there been a negotiation. The maximum fee the exploiting firm would be willing to pay is something less than its net gain. As explained below, the minimum fee the inventive firm will be willing to accept is C trans , so the licensing fee can be approximated as VI -
Simply put, depending on the relative bargaining power of the parties, 58 they will each share a portion of the net return, VI -min{S, SI} -VS -C.
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The model makes four assumptions about L. First, L may be smaller than C, the full cost of inventing, but never smaller than C trans , the cost to the inventive firm of transferring the invention (primarily its lost profits, if any). A simple example illustrates the point. Firm A expends $1 million to invent a widget that lowers its cost of production by $1.2 million. The widget has a value to Firm B of $2 million, and Firm B does not compete with Firm A. From either an ex ante or ex post perspective, Firm A will be willing to transfer the widget to Firm B for something more than $1 and Firm B will be willing to pay something less than $2 million to acquire it. The negotiated license fee could either be lower or higher than C, which equals $1 58 See Blair & Cotter, supra note 33, at 47; Denton & Heald, supra note 9, at 1219-24. 59 Elhauge suggests this is only true where there is only one downstream user of the invention. If there are more, he argues that competition between them will result in all of the invention's value being captured by the patentee. See Elhauge, supra note 47 at 30-33. For this to be true, however, the downstream users must have the same cost of production and be unable to collude (say via merger or joint venture), conditions which seem highly unlikely in real markets.
million. (The vast range in values for L provides a nice example of why we want to the law to induce a negotiation here rather than assign the task to a judge). If the firms are competitors, however, Firm A will demand a payment at least equal to any lost profits caused by transferring the technology to Firm B, that is to say C trans .
Second, the share of the net gain that the inventive firm receives will be sensitive to the probability that the patent is invalid. A rational licensee will demand a discount for the possibility that it is purchasing technology that would be declared by a court to be in the public 73 At common law, injunctions are also authorized when there is the threat of the unauthorized use of property. See, e.g., Lambert v. Holmberg, 712 NW.2d 268, 271 (Neb. 2008) ("When simple acts of trespass are involved, equity generally will not act; however, where the nature and frequency of trespasses are such as to prevent or threaten the substantial enjoyment of the rights of possession and property in land, an injunction will be granted.") difference between the profits that would be earned with the patented invention after adjudication (VI 2 ) and the profits that would be earned with the substitute technology (VS 2 ) after the adjudication of infringement. If an injunction issues, it will force a negotiation between the parties, and the patentee may be able to extract a licensing fee that is close to the cost of switching. 74 This may be in excess of the inventive firm's lost profits, if any, or the price of the license that would have been negotiated freely before the infringement. 75 Lemley uses the term "hold up costs" to describe this premium. 76 In fact, if the infringing firm's switching costs are high enough, it may be willing to agree to a license that results in a net loss.
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Where switching costs are high, an injunction, combined with a damage award, will assure that an exploiting firm is not indifferent to the choice between negotiating and intentionally infringing. Importantly, authorizing injunctive relief in the case of intentional infringement should not usually result in over-deterrence. 76 He says such costs are systematic. Elhauge disagrees. See Elhauge, supra note 47, at 10 ("In short, applying the correct benchmark to their predicted royalty rates under neutral bargaining indicates a royalty overcharge for a strong patent only when the fixed costs of redesign exceed the expected value of the patent, taking into account the odds that the patent claim will be found invalid."). 77 Imagine an infringing firm that expended $1000 to adopt a new process that reduced its operating costs by $1300. If switching back to the old system would cost it $500, then the infringing firm faced with an injunction would be willing to pay, for example, $400 to continue to use the process, leaving it with a net loss of $100. Lemley seems most worried that the net loss scenario will occur when the exploiting firm is selling a multi-component product subject to numerous claims of infringement. See supra note 61, at 1994. It seems clear, however, that a single holdup involving high enough switching costs can force the infringer to negotiate a post adjudication license that results in a net loss. It may be that patent holdup and royalty stacking present analytically the same problem to injunctive relief.
If the infringer's switching costs are low enough, however, a post-adjudication injunction will provide no added deterrence. In that situation, some form of exemplary damages may be justified, especially when the infringement results in lost profits or other consequential damages to the patentee. 78 When there is no actual damage to the patentee, usually due to the fact that the infringer is exploiting the invention in a disparate technological field, the traditional rationale for punitive damages seems less applicable because the only damage suffered by the patent owner is a lost opportunity. Instead, we are interested in channeling transactions primarily to save litigation costs, reduce the cost of judicial error, and capture other benefits of private negotiating.
These are important goals, but they may not require as substantial a punitive award as cases involving competitive damage. It is difficult to be more precise. remedy in all cases, not subject to any divisor. As noted above, the difference between C trans and L, representing the surplus subject to bargaining, has already be discounted for the possibility that the patent in valid. Awards enhanced beyond L in order to deter intentional infringement, like multipliers based on the likelihood of non-detection, should take into account the predicted ex ante enforceability of the patent right.
If a rational exploiting firm would conclude ex ante that the strength 83 of the patent is 50%, then its decision to exploit the technology does not look wholly intentionally tortious. In
Landes and Posner's terms, infringement would not be wholly an act where "the injurer expends real resources to increase the probability of injury."
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In fact, in their seminal paper on intentional torts, they suggest that "because of the presence of mistake an intentional tort may be (economically) indistinguishable from an unintentional tort, an accident case."
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Since the remedy should aim only to deter the marginally wrongful aspect of the infringer's behavior, any enhancement of damages should be reduced by the ex ante probability of enforcement against the exploiting firm. If a reasonable outside opinion letter advises the exploiting firm that there is only a 50% chance that the patent is valid, then only 50% of the exploiting firm's intent should be considered to be wrongful in the economic sense. So, assuming that the exploiting firm's net expected gain from using the patent is $1.5 million, the chance of non-detection is 25% and the patent's strength is 50%, then the augmented portion of the damage award should be $3 million [(1,500,000 x 4) x .5]. Therefore, L, plus any non-detection penalty, should equal $3 million, not $6 million. 83 In other words, that court is likely to declare the patent invalid 50% of the time or is likely to declare work-around technology developed by the exploiting firm to be non-infringing 50% of the time. 84 Accounting for the probability of non-enforcement in the case of injunctive relief is problematic.
For example, if only half of the infringer's conduct is intentionally wrongful, then how should injunctive relief be adjusted? One approach might be to substitute injunctive relief with an award of damages capped by the defendant's switching costs multiplied by the probability that the patent is not enforceable. The defendant's switching costs (Sw) represent the highest fee that the patent owner could negotiate in the post-injunction environment. If the patent is only likely to be enforced 50% of the time, then the exemplary portion of the award should arguably be no more than .5Sw.
B. Infringement by Self-invention/Efficient Transaction
In this case, the exploiting firm's acquisition of the invention increases wealth, but the exploiting firm acquires the invention through self-invention rather than through searching and appropriating. Given the Cotropia & Lemley study discussed at the beginning of the prior section, unintentional infringement through self-invention is likely to present the most common case. 86 Under these conditions, infringement is unintentional and looks negligent. In general, the exclusive goal in negligence cases is to award adequate compensation to the tort victim, so awarding the infringer's profits, an injunction, or other enhanced damages should require special justification. Two sub-cases exist: a) where searching and negotiating would have been more 86 See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
costly than self-inventing (S > SI); and b) where searching and negotiating would have been less costly than self-inventing (S < SI).
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1. S > SI. First, where the cost of searching and negotiating is more costly than selfinventing, the infringing firm has saved resources by self-inventing. Society should prefer the transfer to occur without searching and negotiation, so at first cut damages should be set equal to L, the amount the parties would have agreed upon had the parties costlessly encountered each other. Should damages be adjusted to account for the possibility that the infringer's behavior will sometimes go undetected, creating the chance of systematic undercompensation? Given the high search costs present, it is efficient for both parties to invent. The law does not want to encourage inefficient searching in this case. A multiplier might provide an extra incentive for the patentee to invent in a marginal case, 88 but that gain would be offset by a proportional disincentive to the exploiting firm whom we also want to invent. Multiplication would therefore result in no net gain and a wasted transfer payment.
Indeed, one might ask if there should be liability at all when self-invention is efficient, at least where the patentee suffers no lost profits. Several commentators have suggested that a defense of independent invention should vitiate the normal rule of strict liability for unintentional infringement. 89 In a world without transaction costs, this problem does not arise--the exploiting firm would simply enter into a licensing agreement with the inventive firm, thereby saving the cost of self-invention. 90 This suggests that L is an appropriate starting point consistent with 87 There is only one case in the discussion of intentional infringement because in such cases S always equals zero. 88 Where the cost of inventing is higher than the value of the invention to the patentee firm, but lower than that value plus anticipated license fees paid by third parties. 90 It is assumed that rational inventive firms-and in this scenario both parties function as inventive firms-would agree to a regime where the first to invent (or alternatively the first to apply for a patent) transactional assumptions. However, in reality, when the cost of searching and negotiating is higher than the cost of self-inventing, then it is efficient for the exploiting firm to self-invent instead. If so, damages should be adjusted to account for that expenditure, and optimal damages can be represented by L -SI (the licensing fee minus the reasonable cost of self-invention by the exploiting firm). Any higher award would deter the exploiting firm from efficient selfinvention. 91 The minimum award, of course, must at least be equal to C trans (the patentee's lost profits, if any). Here, interestingly, the most important remedial benchmark for both parties is an award that maintains the infringer incentive to self-invent. Without self-invention by the infringer, the patentee earns no royalty.
This qualified "defense" of self-invention deserves a comment. It is obviously in the interest of inventive firms to lower the costs of searching and negotiating. Successful reform of patent law's notice function, perhaps along the lines of Bessen and Meurer's laundry list of suggestions, would diminish the scope of this suggested limitation on damages. Assigning damages as L -SI provides incentives for inventive firms to write clearer patents and to eschew patent office ploys, like the use of continuing applications, to hide technology from the public.
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The appropriateness of injunctive relief under these conditions differs from the case of intentional infringement. Here, awarding injunctive relief may be costly from a welfare receives a property right in the invention. A complete defense of independent invention would create serious uncertainties in patent enforcement by adding deliberate copying as an element of the offense. Patents would become less predictably enforceable and less reliable as an asset subject to transfer or collateralization. 91 Assume the infringer's cost of self-inventing a widget that saves it $1.2 million in production costs is $800,000, and there are no alternative widgets that will lower production costs. If the patentee and the infringer had encountered each other costlessly, L would likely be quite high, given that the patentee controls technology worth $1.2 million to the infringer. However if L is awarded in the infringement context, and L is calculated at more than $200,000, then the infringer may be deterred from self-invention. Its net gain from self-invention is only $200,000 ($1.2 million -1 million). Fear of an award greater than that amount might result in no self-invention. 92 See Bessen & Meurer, supra note 8, at 62-63 & 220-221.
perspective. When switching costs are high enough and a substantial premium can be extracted by the patentee in a post-adjudication licensing negotiation, the exploiting firm may invest excessively in searching for the patentee. Remember, in this sub-case, any searching is wasted.
In fact, if switching costs are high enough, an award of injunctive relief could even result in a net loss to the self-inventing firm. In such a case, an injunction would deter the infringer from selfinventing under conditions when self-inventing is the optimal behavior. In this sub-case, no injunction should issue and the patentee should be adequately compensated by money damages.
This fact situation may cover many scenarios involving patent "trolls." 93 2. S < SI. When searching and negotiating is less costly that self-inventing, then the exploiting firm has wasted resources by self-inventing in the amount of SI -S. This is the minimum amount that should be awarded to provide incentives for the exploiting firm to conduct a reasonable search. If the presumptive award of L is smaller, than it should be augmented to equal at least SI -S. Such an award should be adequate when the infringing firm's chance of being detected is 100%. Enhancing damages, however, may be necessary to provide an adequate incentive for the infringing firm to search when it knows that sometimes it will infringe and not be caught. This suggests augmenting SI -S to account for the probability that the infringement will go undetected. A multiplier would assure that when an infringing firm gets caught it will bear the full cost of not searching over time. Nonetheless, the activity of self-inventing without knowledge of the patent looks negligent, so the question arises whether multiplying damages--typically found in cases of intentional or reckless torts where tortfeasors seek to cover their tracks--is appropriate.
93 Gerard Magliocca, Blackberries and Barnyards: Patent Trolls and the Perils of Innovation, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1809, 1809 ("'patent troll' … is a derogatory term for firms that use their patents to extract settlements rather than license or manufacture technology.").
A limited version of damage multiplication could theoretically be justified in some versions of this sub-case. Inefficient self-invention in this case could be the result of the intentional decision not to search, a deliberate choice to turn a blind eye to the patent notification system. The choice to harm is not intentional, but self-invention without searching could be characterized as reckless. For related reasons, it may be difficult to justify a multiplier in a case of negligent patent infringement where the patentee has not lost profits. If the inventive firm and a self-inventing infringer operate in different commercial fields, the organization of information in the patent office makes the potentially infringed patent much harder to find. Also, the lack of damages in the case of non-competition further weakens the need for additional deterrence through a multiplier, especially when the infringer conducts a reasonable search prior to self-inventing.
Finally, if the infringing firm conducted a reasonable search 97 prior to self-inventing, and yet failed to find the invention, it seems clear that the damage award should not be augmented.
The appropriateness of injunctive relief under these conditions is more complex than in the prior sub-case. Like an accounting of the infringer's profits or punitive damages, an 94 injunction functions as extra-compensatory relief. In light of the discussion immediately above, significant extra-compensatory relief is unlikely to be justified. Nonetheless, allowing the patent royalty "hold up" in this sub-case may be desirable on occasion. The injunction, with its attendant cost to the exploiting firm, has the benefit of increasing incentives to search where searching is the efficient strategy, although the fear of paying a heavy post-adjudication licensing premium could encourage wasteful over-searching. Even when an injunction might be considered, conducting a reasonable search should therefore provide a defense to injunctive relief.
C. Intentional Infringement/Inefficient Transaction
In a world with perfect information and with no bargaining or search costs, no transaction between the inventive firm and the exploiting firm would occur when the inventive firm's cost of inventing is greater than the net value of the invention. Why then do such transactions occur in reality? And most importantly, under these conditions, what stimulates the creation of the invention in the first place when a deal with the potential buyer is inefficient? First, some inventions are fortuitous (C = 0), and some are the result of miscalculations by the inventing firm. For example, if the inventing firm believes that a new widget will help it save $3 million in production costs, it might invest $2 million to create it. If the inventing firm turns out to be mistaken (the widget generates no cost savings to it at all), it will be left with a widget that could still have some lesser value (say $1 million) to another firm that might infringe.
One can imagine an alternative scenario where invention still occurs despite the fact it would be inefficient from an ex ante perspective. For example, if the exploiting firm believes that a widget will lower its production costs $2 million, it may contract with the inventive firm for the production of the widget for payments of $70,000 per year for the 20-year life of the widget patent. Ignoring the time value of money, the inventive firm may be willing to invent the widget if the cost of invention is, say, $800,000. Assume further that once the widget is invented, the exploiting firm finds that its production cost savings are only $500,000, and it breaches the licensing agreement. From an ex ante perspective, the transaction is inefficient ($500,000 -$800,000 = -$300,000); nonetheless, the exploiting firm is an infringer if it continues to use the widget. Moreover, from an ex post perspective, it may be efficient for the infringing firm to continue to use the widget if there are no better alternatives or switching costs are high.
In these situations, L has a positive value and should be awarded. Indeed, it has already been calculated by the parties as the contract price. Although from an ex ante perspective, the deal is inefficient, from an ex post perspective it is an efficient salvage operation. The inventive firm has created something of value to the infringing firm and all our reasons for preferring a voluntary transfer apply, especially when a deal has already been negotiated. The infringer's opportunistic behavior looks very much like an intentional tort, so relief beyond L may be justified to deter the infringing firm's behavior. An accounting of the infringer's profits is an option, but since the probability of non-detection is zero when the parties have contracted, no multiplier would likely be available. Injunctive relief is another likely means of deterrence. If switching costs are high, then the hold-up premium should have a significant deterrent effect. If switching costs are low, then the infringer will adopt a non-infringing substitute and be guilty merely of breach of contract. There is no reason not to award injunctive relief in all cases, subject to the caveats set forth in Section A. The hypothetical in the prior paragraph should be treated in a similar fashion.
Finally, a transaction may also be inefficient if the infringer's use of the invention results in a net loss to it. For example, if an infringing widget is less productive than an alternative substitute (VI -VS < 0) to the infringing firm, then the infringement will result in a net loss to the exploiting firm. It will not only have behaved wrongfully, but it will have suffered for its behavior. Given that most such transactions should be self-deterring, granting a relief may not be crucial to overall efficiency. Analyzing the scenario more closely, L will be nominal or zero.
There is no net gain for the exploiting firm and the inventive firm to share. In addition, there should be no lost profits, because had the infringing firm chosen the better substitute technology it would have caused more damage to competitive firms. This leaves injunctive relief as the only potential remedy. Given that the infringer should already be adequately deterred from appropriating the invention, there seems little reason to give an incentive to the inventing firm to engage in costly litigation in the hope of capturing some of the infringer's switching costs. The game does not seem worth the candle here.
D. Infringement by Self-invention/Inefficient Transaction
Most infringements via self-invention in this category result in a net loss to the exploiting firm. These are cases where the exploiting firm has miscalculated the value of the invention (including the cost to invent it) or the underestimated the value of alternative technology. In other words, the infringer is a victim of its own negligent behavior. In the absence of competitive losses by the patentee, one could argue that only nominal damages should be awarded. An award of nominal damages, however, would provide no incentives for the exploiting firm to search in a context where some searching might be efficient. A search may have revealed the invention, thereby saving the cost of inventing. If the exploiting firm would be deterred from self-inventing by that discovery, then a case for damages might be made when the cost of the search is smaller than the loss to the exploiting firm from its inefficient self-invention.
Note this argument is somewhat odd, in that the existence of those costs should already be sufficient to deter the firm from its inefficient behavior.
Even if, ex ante, the inventive firm and the exploiting firm would not have entered into a license, an injunction will force a post-adjudication license where the infringing firm's switching costs are high. Having to pay a hold-up license fee will exacerbate the infringer's losses due to its miscalculation and provide extra incentives for it to take care. But will it stimulate excessive care? Search costs incurred beyond the loss caused by self-invention are clearly wasted, so injunctive relief may in some circumstances stimulate excessive searching (e.g., when both switching costs and the hold-up license fee are very large). On the other hand, if the fear of paying the fee provides the marginal extra incentive necessary to reveal the invention and reduce significant losses, then injunctive relief would be justified. The infringer's loss from selfinvention can be represented as SI -VI, the cost of self-invention minus the value of the invention. To account for the opportunity cost of not using the best known alternative substitute, we set the infringer's loss at VS + (SI -VI) . 98 This loss is the incentive for the infringer to search for the invention in the absence of injunctive relief. We want the exploiting firm to search,
therefore, when S < VS + (SI -VI).
Under these conditions an injunction should issue.
IV.
The need for rethinking of remedies for patent infringement is pressing in a world where "patent-granting countries have yet to identify a regime that maximizes welfare and is 98 Strictly speaking, VS here is the cost of switching to the best alternative substitute. the determination whether injunctive relief is appropriate. 102 The present law on injunctive is ambiguous and provides no express role for any of these factors. Third, a qualified defense of independent invention is justified for the first time as part of a comprehensive model of patent remedies.
C. Descriptive Conclusions
As a descriptive matter, the model has significant explanatory power, especially in a time of controversial patent reform proposals. 104 The patent act provides that the court "shall award the claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a Id. at 391 ("According to well-established principles of equity, a plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor test before a court may grant such relief. A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction."). 110 Id. at 394 111 Although the Court is on the right path with abandonment of the per se rule, its adoption of the fourpart test focusing on irreparable injury, inadequacy of monetary remedies, the balance of hardships, and the public interest, seems ill-suited to the consideration of key factors like the infringer's mental state (although deterring inefficient post-adjudication hold-ups might be considered under the public interest rubric). In order for injunctive relief to better serve the purposes underlying patent law, a broader understanding of what factors are relevant at equity should be employed. 121 Nonetheless, Lemley's baseline royalty calculation has been criticized, 122 and neither he nor Elhauge offers a comprehensive model for patent remedies.
They have dived deep into the heart of an important matter and accurately describe some of the problem's critical contours. This model seeks to provide the full picture.
To conclude, one thrust of current patent reform efforts focuses on remedies, with the most frequent object of discussion being the "patent troll," the non-exploiting owner of a patent whose business model is based on extracting licensing fees from unintentional infringers. To the extent that the model described here provides significant protection for negligent self-inventors
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Variables: VI = gross value of the invention to the exploiting firm in terms of additional profits earned from additional sales or manufacturing costs saved S = cost of searching for the invention and negotiating a license SI = cost to the exploiting firm of self-inventing VS = value to the exploiting firm of the known best substitute for the invention C = pro rata cost to the inventing firm of producing the invention for the infringer Ng = the exploiting firm's net gain, equaling VI -min{S, SI} -VS L = license fee Sw = the infringer's cost of switching to a non-infringing technology θ = the probability that the patent is valid and infringed ρ = the probability that the infringement will go undetected Assuming a transaction is efficient when: VI -min{S, SI} -VS > C, when
